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2It’s the age-old dilemma for nonprofit leaders: whether to take resources that could be 
spent on programs and invest them instead in the organization itself, hiring much-
needed staff, or upgrading outdated computer systems. Given the urgency of the 
needs nonprofits exist to serve, outward-facing initiatives win out nearly every time. It’s 
hard to rationalize purchasing new software or making another long-term investment 
when the money, applied directly to a program, might make an immediate difference in 
the life of a service recipient.
But there’s a reason that this selfless behavior, however right it feels in the short term, 
is dangerous over time. It’s roughly the same reason that flight attendants tell airline 
passengers that if the cabin loses pressure, they’re to put their own oxygen masks on 
before helping others. If your own capabilities are compromised, you won’t be able to 
help others as effectively—particularly over time. Nonprofits that allow organizational 
investments to lag program growth often struggle. It isn’t just that staff burn out.
Ultimately, results can be threatened, too.
This was the situation Aspire Public Schools was facing in 2006. Driven by their desire 
to improve educational opportunities for California youth, Aspire’s leaders had 
committed to an aggressive growth track. Two years into that plan, however, with new 
schools opening on schedule, they found themselves overtaxed and concerned about 
maintaining quality outcomes. It was no longer just an option but rather an imperative 
to tend to the organization’s internal needs.
The Context
Founded in 1998 in San Francisco by Don Shalvey, former superintendent of the San 
Carlos Unified School District, with seed money from entrepreneur Reed Hastings, 
Aspire opened its first two elementary schools in 1999.1 Fueled by early success, the 
organization grew rapidly, and by the end of 2003 was operating 10 high-performing
elementary and middle schools in five districts. The schools had a 91 percent re-
  
1 Aspire was known as University Public Schools during its first year of operation.
3enrollment rate, and demand for spots in them exceeded capacity by over 50 percent. 
Two Aspire schools placed in the top 1 percent of all California schools based on points 
gained on the state’s Academic Performance Index. More than 90 percent of Aspire 
parents rated their children’s school an “A” or a “B” (compared with a national average 
of about 58 percent), and 97 percent of teachers expressed satisfaction with their job.
The organization’s five-year anniversary in 2003 provided a natural opportunity for 
CEO Shalvey and the rest of his leadership team to take inventory of their progress. In 
2004 they developed a strategic growth plan that called for an even more aggressive 
trajectory: Aspire would operate 50 schools by 2015 and increase its impact as an 
advocate for education reform throughout California. As part of that expansion, Aspire 
would also begin to open high schools.
To ensure that the organization could handle the operational demands of growth, the 
plan also set explicit goals for bolstering infrastructure and adding senior managers.
Aspire’s new schools would be grouped into “clusters” of 12 to 15 schools in four 
geographies: the Bay Area, Sacramento, Central Valley, and Los Angeles. The Bay 
Area home office would continue to set strategy and manage quality across the 
organization. A network of new regional offices in the three other geographies, each led 
by a regional vice president (RVP), would serve the clusters more directly. Located no 
more than an hour’s drive from any of the schools they handled, regional staff would 
implement Aspire’s systems and processes, manage quality at a more localized level, 
and provide day-to-day support to schools in their cluster. The home office would 
provide operational support for new schools over the short term, until the regional 
offices were up and running. 
Aspire quickly made progress towards its hiring goals at the senior-most levels. For 
example, in 2004 Mike Barr joined the organization as vice president of finance (he 
would become CFO shortly thereafter), and Linda Frost was hired as the Central Valley
regional vice president. Barr and Frost joined the existing leadership team of Shalvey;
Elise Darwish, the chief academic officer (CAO); and Gloria Lee, chief operating officer 
(COO).
As the organization continued to open new schools, however, the leadership team fell
behind in its plan to fill several of the other management positions—specifically the 
much needed regional vice president slots. In 2006 Aspire’s team realized that a vice 
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schools. Shalvey assigned the position to Frost, a former high school principal and 
superintendent, in October 2006. But Frost’s move into this role in November left 
Aspire with no regional vice presidents. As a result, Aspire was unable to open any of 
the planned regional offices. Instead, members of the leadership team—in particular, 
Shalvey, Darwish, and Lee—found themselves fulfilling not only their respective senior 
management role, but also the role of an RVP. As such, they were constantly traveling 
back and forth from Aspire’s various locations.
As Shalvey described, “Elise, Gloria, and I were on the road three or four days per 
week. Most of our key work was devoted to RVP functions, especially since there were 
four new schools and six new principals. School achievement and building capacity of 
the new principals became the most important work. Certainly we couldn’t devote as 
much time to our other functions—especially Elise, our chief academic officer. We 
found ourselves making decisions on the phone and in conference calls in our cars. 
Our long history together and effective instructional systems (and team members) 
enabled us to meet our school achievement targets, but momentum was slowing and 
key strategic initiatives weren’t being addressed at satisfactory levels. We all knew 
that.” 
Aspire had become the biggest charter management nonprofit in the state. The 
organization continued to achieve successful outcomes, and was beginning to serve 
as a role model for other education nonprofits. But the leadership team was 
increasingly concerned about the organization’s ability to continue to perform and 
improve school performance—particularly at the high school level, as this was a new 
area for them—if Aspire continued to grow apace. 
Then, in late 2006, representatives from the city of Fresno and the Mayor himself
contacted Shalvey and asked if Aspire would establish a presence in Fresno, a district 
where school performance was suffering. Fresno was over 90 miles from the closest
Aspire location and 180 miles from the home office. Nonetheless, Shalvey was in favor 
of the idea, given the large number of students in need. But in order for this move to be 
economically feasible, Aspire would need to open a cluster of several schools in 
Fresno. At this prospect, the rest of the leadership team pushed back. As one team 
member explained, “We simply put our foot down about Fresno because we couldn’t 
5grow without RVPs in place.” COO Lee summarized the situation: “We want 50 quality 
schools, not 50 mediocre schools.” 
Key Questions 
The five-member leadership team was over-extended and stressed about providing 
adequate levels of support to schools. In addition, they were at odds over the prospect 
of further growth in a new region. They knew that these issues could be substantively 
addressed by hiring the planned-for regional vice presidents, yet they weren’t making 
any progress on that front. Was it simply that they lacked the time to devote to a 
carefully managed recruiting and hiring effort? Or were other issues affecting their 
ability to expand their capacity? The team worked with Bridgespan over a three-month 
period beginning in January 2007 to answer the following questions: 
· Why hadn’t Aspire’s leadership team filled the RVP positions? 
· What would they need to do in order to feel confident that they could expand to 
a new region without sacrificing quality? 
· Would their approach to growth have to change (and if so, how) to ensure that 
they wouldn’t find themselves similarly over-extended down the road? 
Why Hadn’t the Leadership Team Filled the RVP 
Positions?
Shalvey and his colleagues had hired principals and teachers on schedule with the 
2004 plan. IT, HR, and other home-office staff had also joined, albeit a bit more slowly. 
What was different about hiring regional vice presidents? 
It certainly wasn’t for lack of need. Through several discussions, Aspire’s leadership 
team members acknowledged the stress they were under. They recognized that by 
taking on RVP responsibilities themselves, they were under-investing in other areas. 
For example, the group wasn’t giving the schools, particularly the high schools, as 
much support as they wanted to, raising concerns about quality. As one team member 
6said, “I can’t support my principals the way I should while doing another full-time job.” 
What’s more, as noted earlier, Aspire couldn’t open any regional offices without the 
RVPs. And without regional offices, Bay Area-based instructional coaches were 
supporting schools as far away as Los Angeles, ballooning their commute time. The
coaches, too, were showing the strain. If the situation were not remedied quickly, 
turnover was likely to become an issue. With these realizations on the table, the 
leadership team agreed that the lack of RVP capacity was hurting Aspire’s ability to 
grow with quality.
If not lack of need, what else could explain the unfilled RVP positions? The locus of the 
discussions shifted, and Shalvey and his colleagues examined several possible 
causes. Was it a lack of qualified candidates for the RVP positions? Perhaps. The 
team agreed that they hadn’t seen the right person for the job. On the other hand, few 
resources had been put toward recruiting, and the executive search firm charged with 
recruiting RVPs had been put on hold. Maybe, then, it was lack of clarity about the
skills and experiences they were looking for in an RVP candidate. Further probing 
revealed confusion did indeed exist here: Some thought instructional expertise was 
crucial, others prioritized operational expertise, and everyone agreed that it would be 
quite challenging to find enough individuals who were experts in both. But while 
finalizing the target candidate profile would require debate and compromise, the task 
was definitely doable. Might funding be the problem? There was certainly concern 
about the cost of hiring RVPs and using funding that otherwise could be put toward the 
schools directly or kept in reserve in case of an emergency. Cost was a key concern to 
Shalvey. Eventually, however, the team agreed that if they needed to raise the funds, 
they could.
These likely stumbling blocks were issues, but ones that they could surmount. Shalvey 
and his colleagues began to realize that a deeper root cause must be at play. 
Discussions uncovered that there was a profound anxiety about how Aspire could 
maintain quality as the leadership ranks expanded and it became impossible for the 
existing team of five to “touch” every school directly on a regular basis. The RVPs 
would be out in the field making critical decisions. These people would be new to 
Aspire; promoting from within was not an option, as no current staff would be ready to 
take on the RVP role for at least a few years. Would an outside hire be able to do
things “the Aspire way?”   
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continue to crop up and jeopardize the organization’s ability to sustain growth and 
quality.  
Ensuring Quality through Clear Decision-Making
How could Aspire ensure that the new RVPs would maintain quality outcomes and 
adhere to “the Aspire way?” Without this assurance, the team would continue to find 
reasons not to hire RVPs. The organization needed an approach to define the
appropriate level of accountability RVPs would hold. 
Doing so would mean defining, for the first time, the boundaries of accountability for 
each of the leadership team positions. Aspire had a culture of shared accountability. 
The leadership team, in particular, was a tight unit. Shalvey, Lee, and Darwish 
collectively had made all critical strategic decisions for the organization for more than 
five years. Each team member had significant influence and input, with Shalvey 
making the final decisions on areas where the team could not reach consensus. This 
decision-making approach would need to change in order to incorporate the new RVPs 
into the organization.  
Establishing Clear Decision-Making Principles
To that end, they articulated four principles of decision-making that they felt would 
simplify the decision-making process, allow for consistency, and also, importantly, 
allow for a reasonable amount of autonomy: 
1) Have a single person own each decision where possible. This principle 
would promote clarity about who was responsible for what, and accountability 
for the results of the decision.
2) Give decision-making authority to the person who is accountable for the 
outcome of the decision. This principle would allow the person who would 
likely have the best information to make the decision. It would also help the 
8person responsible for the outcome feel as if they “owned” the decision and 
were not simply carrying out someone else’s orders.
3) Make as many decisions at the local level as possible. This principle was 
an extension of the second principle. For example, decisions that affected the 
outcomes of one school should be made by that school, and decisions that 
affected the outcomes of one region should be made by that region. 
4) Make decisions about elements that must be common across schools at 
the home office level. This principle assured the senior leadership team that 
critical elements, such as Aspire’s instructional approach, would be consistent 
across the network. 
With the principles on paper, the team immediately put them to use, vetting a 
worrisome issue: the desire to maintain Aspire’s proven educational approach across 
all schools. The educational approach included the goals for academic outcomes, the 
types of students Aspire targeted, and the organization’s instructional strategies. The 
team feared that principals and teachers might follow RVP decisions that conflicted 
with Aspire’s educational approach. Following the new principles, the team clarified 
that the CEO ultimately would decide on and be accountable for Aspire’s academic 
model and philosophy. The CAO would drive Aspire’s cycle of inquiry (i.e., standards, 
assessment, core curriculum, and pacing). The RVP would make decisions and be 
accountable for outcomes at schools in their regions. Principals would own outcomes 
at their school, and teachers in their classroom. 
The principles explicitly allowed each party to make decisions on his or her own, but 
also set boundaries for those decisions, and identified the point at which another level 
of input and authority would be required. For example, an RVP could not develop a 
ninth grade English curriculum that deviated from the core curriculum the CAO 
developed. But, an RVP could allocate teachers across classes, and also would be in 
charge of local teacher recruiting. Exhibit A summarizes the decision-making hierarchy.
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Example: Who is accountable for achieving excellent academic outcomes?
Decides on and is accountable for Aspire’s 
academic model and philosophy
Decides on and is accountable for driving the cycle of inquiry 
(setting standards, assessment, the core curriculum and 
instructional pacing)
Make decisions and are accountable for academic 
outcomes at the schools in their region
Make decisions and are accountable for 
academic outcomes at their school
Make decisions and are 
accountable for 
academic outcomes in 
their classroom 
Chief 
Executive 
Officer
Chief 
Academic 
Officer
Regional 
Vice 
Presidents
Principals
Teachers
Exhibit A: Using principles to clarify levels of accountability across the network
Developing and articulating this structured approach to separating decisions and 
decision-makers was a critical breakthrough for the Aspire team. With this framework in 
place, the key aspects of the “Aspire way” would be maintained by the higher-level 
decisions made by the CEO and CAO. These top-level leaders would then be able to 
delegate other decisions to the RVPs without worrying that doing so could lead to 
compromised quality.
Assigning Specific Decision-Making Roles
With this major step taken, the team could then turn to creating more detailed decision-
making parameters. They used a decision-making tool called RAPIDSM. In a nutshell, 
RAPID helps organizations clarify existing decision-making processes, and establish 
guidelines for decision-making going forward by “mapping” the various roles or 
activities that any given decision requires. Each of the letters in the name represents 
one such activity or role. The letters do not indicate an ordered process; the name is 
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simply an easy way to remember the elements involved. The “D,” for example, 
indicates the person who makes the final decision. The “I” indicates those who provide 
input; the “R,” those who make a recommendation to the decision maker. The “P” 
stands for the people who carry out or perform the decision; and the “A” represents 
those who must approve the decision (or wield veto power). In some cases, the same 
people will take on multiple roles. For example, the person who recommends a 
decision may be the same one to perform, or execute, once the decision is made.2
RAPID helped the team see more explicitly how it would be possible to add a layer of 
management without losing control of quality or ceding the essential components of 
Aspire’s educational model. For example, consider how the team used RAPID to clarify 
decisions about who owned the Aspire curriculum. After some debate, the team 
determined that with regard to curriculum, the CAO would both recommend (R) and 
make the decision (D) about what curriculum to use. She would gather input (I) from
the CEO, RVPs, coaches, principals, and more experienced teachers. Coaches and 
experienced teachers would be the primary performers (P) and roll-out and train staff in 
how to use the curriculum. These roles aligned with the accountability principles that 
indicated the CAO was ultimately the authority over the Aspire curriculum. Neither the 
RVP nor the CEO controlled this decision, although both would be consulted for their 
input.
In a series of meetings, the team worked their way through all of the major decisions 
they could identify that would involve the new level of management, including school-
level budgets. Shalvey recalled, “These conversations were crucial. It is challenging to 
transition from an informal system to one with clear decision-making roles. You need to 
do a lot of communicating to ensure feelings don’t get hurt as people are left out of
decisions they used to be a part of. The RAPID tool is a great approach if you’re 
disciplined about using it. The meetings had their tense moments, but there was an 
underlying positive energy because of the alignment we’d created between the roles 
and responsibilities.”
  
2 For a more complete description of RAPID, see “RAPIDSM Decision-Making: What it is, why we like it, 
and how to get the most out of it,” by Jon Huggett and Caitrin Moran on www.bridgespan.org.
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Healthy growth Unhealthy growth
• We add a school that will deliver 
benefits to the kids in that school 
and make the Aspire network and 
organization stronger
• We add a school that will deliver 
benefits to the kids in that school 
but may weaken the Aspire 
network by
-Over-stretching organizational 
capabilities, which may 
diminish educational outcomes 
in existing schools
-Over-stretching the time of key 
individuals, which may risk 
turnover of our most valuable 
people
-Creating a financial strain on 
the organization
Promoting “Healthy Growth”
With decision-making principles and roles for key decisions clear, the team members 
began to explore how to ensure organizational capacity kept pace with school growth 
in the future. The team realized that not investing adequately in the organization was 
threatening its ability to grow in a high-quality way. What this looked like in practice 
was deciding to add a new school that ultimately weakened the overall Aspire network 
by stretching staff and/or creating a financial strain. The team described the situation 
as “unhealthy growth.” 
“Healthy growth,” in contrast, meant operating a new school while sustaining 
reasonable workloads and ensuring that existing schools continued to receive full 
support. In other words, it meant having an environment in which staff, at all levels, felt 
that they had the time, energy, and resources to put their best effort towards their 
responsibilities. This simple concept of healthy versus unhealthy growth helped the 
Aspire team develop a common language that incorporated organizational 
sustainability into their growth equation.
Exhibit B: Healthy vs. Unhealthy Growth
Now the team members would need to make the theory practical. They needed to 
figure out how to build the idea of healthy growth into their decision-making. Part of 
Aspire’s current growth process was the analysis of a district’s attractiveness. Aspire 
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used a planning tool that assessed districts across parameters such as availability and 
cost of facilities, student need, and availability of funding. For example, in gauging 
facilities affordability and availability, the tool considered office and industrial vacancy 
rates and average rents per square foot. It weighted each of these parameters and
calculated an overall attractiveness score for each district. 
The tool did a superb job of evaluating and prioritizing among potential school sites,
but it was not sufficient to ensure healthy growth for the network. To complement it and 
reinforce the healthy growth concept, the team developed four decision rules. Aspire 
would only add a school to the network if the leadership team agreed that the school 
would: 
1) Meet student need. Aspire focused on serving disadvantaged students. 
Accordingly, the school had to be in an area where a large number of
disadvantaged youth resided. 
2) Align with a cluster plan. Clustering schools geographically was critical to 
making the regional model work. Any new school had to be in a location where 
Aspire was developing a cluster. One-off schools were not part of the plan. 
3) Support regional office and home office sustainability. This rule explicitly 
embedded organizational capacity into the growth process. A regional structure 
needed to be in place to support the new school. At a minimum an RVP would 
need to be in place. Additionally, the home office had to have sufficient 
capacity to support both the new school and the existing schools in the 
network. 
4) Meet specific facilities criteria. The new school opportunity had to meet 
Aspire’s financial guidelines. For example, Aspire had set a target that on 
average facilities would make up no more than 12 percent of total school 
costs.
For an example of these rules in practice, consider the Fresno opportunity mentioned 
at the outset of this case study. How should Aspire respond to the Mayor’s request? 
Would saying “yes” constitute healthy or unhealthy growth? 
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There were certainly needy students in Fresno that matched the kind of students 
Aspire wished to serve (Rule #1). Fresno’s Mayor and the City Council recently had 
passed a resolution that committed the city to bringing quality charter organizations like 
Aspire to the city. This development made the possibility of opening multiple schools in 
Fresno look promising, and led Aspire’s team to believe that the organization could 
develop a “cluster worth” of schools there (Rule #2). Fresno also was working to make 
facilities options more affordable, having committed to fast-tracking facilities projects 
and actively seeking funding to establish a charter incubator and facilities financing
(Rule #4). The main sticking point, then, on the healthy growth screen, was that an 
RVP was not yet in place to manage a new cluster of schools in Fresno (Rule #3). 
Fresno was located quite a distance south of Aspire’s other Central Valley schools—
too far south to serve it out of the same regional office. Before the Aspire team 
members could commit to opening schools in Fresno, they would need to create and 
fill a new RVP position.
Aspire’s team was emboldened by the new clarity of roles and new lens on growth 
decisions. They had uncovered the root cause of their inability to hire RVPs. They had 
addressed it by clarifying decision-making authority at a broad level, and making 
explicit the roles and responsibilities associated with specific and potentially 
contentious decisions. They had defined healthy growth and embedded into their 
growth decisions a way to debate whether a growth opportunity supported 
sustainability. The team was ready to hire RVPs, and team members were confident 
that their new approach would keep them from over-extending themselves down the 
road.  They determined that they would hire or promote three new RVPs by the end of 
the 2007-08 school year. This number would increase to four RVPs to support the four 
clusters that would ultimately make up Aspire’s full network of schools. 
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Making Change and Moving Forward
Since March of 2007 Aspire has made significant progress building the organizational 
capacity to support growth. They have identified two full time RVPs—one for the 
Central Valley (Alex Hernandez) and one for the Bay Area (Gloria Lee). Lee moved into 
the RVP role from her former position as COO. A new COO, James Wilcox, was hired.
The CAO and COO no longer support dual roles, but rather are focusing on their 
primary responsibilities. 
Aspire opened its first cluster office in Stockton in July 2007 to support its Northern 
Central Valley schools. As of the writing of this case study, the organization has seven
staff members working out of this cluster office. The addition of RVPs allowed Aspire to 
open three new schools in the fall of 2007: Millsmont Secondary in Oakland, Port City
Academy in Stockton, and a still-to-be-named elementary school in Huntington Park.
“The hard work of learning the importance of ‘healthy growth’ is now reaping a harvest 
of efficiency and performance,” said Shalvey in a recent conversation. It was no 
coincidence that he was staring at a map of downtown Fresno when he made the 
comment. Now that Aspire has established a track record for successfully bringing in 
RVPs, healthy growth to Fresno is looking like a real possibility.
